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Kato initially gained international prominence in 2008, when a court in Manila overruled a peace deal struck between the MILF and the government of then-President Gloria Arroyo that gave the rebels an ancestral domain in central Mindanao. That legal decision resulted in widespread attacks across the south, leaving 300 people dead and 600,000 people homeless. Four decades of civil war have killed 120,000 people, displaced another two million and ensured the resource rich Muslim south remains the poorest of the poor in the Philippines.

in the 1990s the international press portrayed southeast asianislam as politically moderate, genuinely friendly toward the West, andeconomically and developmentally focused. (19) This view seemed to capturethe spirit of modern Malaysia under the dynamic "Malaysia Boleh!"(Malaysia Can Do It!) leadership of Mahathir Mohammad and modern Indonesia, asecular, nationalist state ruled along authoritarian, corporatist lines bySuharto's New Order (1966-1998). During the New Order era,Indonesia's majority Muslim population was represented mainly by twoofficially sanctioned organizations, the Nahdlatul Ulama (Islamic ScholarsAwakening) and Muhammadiyah (Followers of Muhammad). With a combinedmembership of over seventy million, the leaders of these organizationspromoted a politically quiescent, secularized, and tolerant Islamic doctrineof religious self-understanding. (20) Moreover, the concerns of thesereligious movements reflected national and practical concerns, even afterIndonesia's democratic transformation. As the late Abdurrahman Wahid,the former Nadhlatul leader and Indonesia's first democratically electedpresident, observed in 2007, the New Order as well as its successor regimeare preoccupied with "national development," and "giveattention to only one thing, and that is [economic] growth." (21)

The JI and the MMI consequently exploited the uncertain transitionin internal security arrangements to recruit fighters and sponsorinter-communal violence in Ambon, Maluku, and Sulawesi. Moreover, after thePhilippine military overran Camp Abubakar in Mindanao, JI had, in thisrelatively short period, acquired the resources and capacity to establish itsown training camps in Poso, Central Sulawesi by 2000. In December the sameyear, Hambali organized attacks on Christian churches across Java--the mostwidespread terror attacks in Indonesian history, which bore the al-Qaedasignature of multiple coordinated targeting. (44) Involved in Hambali'sIndonesian terror campaign were al-Mukmin graduates Mukhlas, who alsooperated under the nom de guerre Ali Gufron, Imam Samudra and Mukhlas'brother, Amrozi bin Nurhasyim. The same team was also involved in bombing achurch in Batam in January 2001. By 2001, Hambali had established himself asthe effective chief executive officer for JI terror operations, coordinatinga network within the wider JI and MMI franchises. This militant tendencywithin JI reached the apex of both its power and regional influence in early2002. (45)

Kith, kinship, and exogenous marriage ties therefore facilitatedthe network's proliferation and the promulgation of its ideology.Intermarriage extended JI's links from Afghanistan through Malaysia andIndonesia to Sydney and Melbourne. At the same time, this long-gestatingIslamist qabilah (tribe) dedicated to transforming the region into a daulahIslam spread their message using modern communications systems: it wasdetermined to transcend the nation-state in order to forge a transnationalnetwork that created a virtual Islamic realm with the potential to disrupt,disorganize, paralyze, and terrorize insecure postcolonial states.Globalization of communication facilitated these interconnections, whilefunding from a variety of sources including remittances, ransoms, charities,and front organizations lubricated the process. For instance, according toFBI section chief Dennis Lormel, clandestine funds found their way from theMiddle East into Southeast Asia through the operation of Saudi-sponsoredcharity organizations. After 1999, the JI successfully embedded members or"coopted Saudi charities (al-Haramain and IIRO), their Indonesiancounterparts (Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis, or KOMPAK, CrisisPrevention Committee), and the Medical Emergency Relief Charity (MERC) thatwas used to support militant activities." (66) In August 2006, the U.S.Treasury belatedly identified the IIRO's Indonesian and Philippineoffices as "facilitating fund raising for al-Qaeda and affiliatedterrorist groups." (67)

In many ways, the scale of the intelligence failure across theregion reflected a wider inter-governmental complacency towards the spread ofIslamist extremism prior to the Bali bombing. The region consistentlyunderestimated the nature and extent of the threat. Thus, regional scholarbureaucrats like Jusuf Wanandi of the Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies in Jakarta maintained that "attention to such groups as LaskarJihad has been overblown. They are rather noisy groups, but small andmarginal." (79) Such views found their echo in Australian assessmentswhere security analysts claimed barely a week before the Bali attack that"the tendency is still to overplay [the terror] threat." (80)

In this assessment of the complex linkages binding and sustainingIslamist groupings in Southeast Asia, we have demonstrated that understandingorganizational evolution and "informal networks" is useful as ananalytical tool to aid comprehension of how jihadist groups form, develop,mutate, and spread. However, making the organizational structure the centralexplanatory variable for jihadist activity, as many contemporary commentatorsdo, confuses ends and means.

Ultimately, informal networks are the means, not the ends, ofjihadist actions. Complex networking is instrumental to the spread ofIslamist ideology. The contention is validated when we examine the motivesfor broadening the web of jihadist activism throughout Southeast Asia duringthe first decade of the twentieth century and its continuing resiliencetoday. This conclusion is reinforced by the official attitudes and actions ofthe states of Southeast Asia that have put a premium on confronting theideological motivation for jihad as the cornerstone of their countertenorpolicy and which, as we have shown, have done much to degrade theeffectiveness of the networking that sustains groups like JI. 041b061a72